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## CONTENTS

## THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

## SPAIN

- Links Between NATO, Detente Discussed  
(Andres Ortega Klein; EL PAIS, 13, 14 Aug 80)..... 1

## COUNTRY SECTION

## AUSTRIA

- Kreisky Interviewed on AKH Scandal, Androsch Involvement  
(Bruno Kreisky Interview; PROFIL, 1 Sep 80)..... 6
- Public Shows Mixed Reaction to Kreisky, Androsch Affair  
(NEUF ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, 9 Sep 80)..... 17

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Neonazi Terrorist Group, Leader Arrested  
(DER SPIEGEL, 8 Sep 80)..... 20

## NETHERLANDS

- D'66 Position Continues Getting Stronger  
(Frank Lafor; ELSEVIER'S MAGAZINE, 6 Sep 80)..... 25
- PvdA, D'66 Submit Draft on Abortion Law  
(NRC HANDELSBLAD, 3 Sep 80)..... 29

## LINKS BETWEEN NATO, DETENTE DISCUSSED

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 13, 14 Aug 80

[Article by Andres Ortega Klein: "NATO and Detente"]

[13 Aug 80, p 2]

[Text] The history of the cold war and, hence, of the Atlantic Alliance will be written over and over again, because historians will never reach a complete agreement on the terms of discussion. Even at the risk of misrepresenting the essential elements by summarizing them, as Adorno was supposed to have said, we ought to look briefly at the past in order to understand the present. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed more than three decades ago, on 4 April 1949, at the urging of certain Europeans, and shortly thereafter, during the Korean War, it became known by the acronym NATO. It was, of course, an attempt to defend a social and economic system, although the river roared louder and its bed was deeper than a bipolar view would suggest.

Europe's weakened condition after World War II and its resulting dependence on the United States, the need to curb a venturesome Soviet foreign policy and, in a word, the search for an international order led to the creation of an unbalanced system of alliances in Europe. There is no lack of theories about conspiracies at Yalta or Potsdam to explain this; historical trends point to a number of temporary geographic developments in which we can find the roots of many of the problems that Europe and, therefore, we would assume, Spain faces today.

With the United States superior in the nuclear sphere and the Soviet Union locally superior in conventional forces, European stability was preserved by the threat of war, a war that both sides could, in their own way, win. Hence the alliances and Europe's hostage status. A whole series of issues eventually converged on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which formalized the Soviet system of bilateral alliances as a reaction to the rearming of the FRG and its entry into the Western alliance. In point of fact, the system of alliances was intended to contain not only the Soviet Union but the German problem, /the/ [in boldface]

European problem, as well, as De Gaulle and, from a different perspective, German Social Democrats intelligently saw.

This problem, to which we must, of course, add geostrategical factors and the NATO doctrine of advanced defense, prompted the alliance to establish, in Clausewitz's language, a center of gravity: the central area. This entailed and still entails serious problems for the flanks, especially the southern flank, which Spain would join should it decide to become part of NATO. Official doctrine (the aforementioned advanced defense and, since 1967, the notion of flexible response) is no longer discussed, given the tensions that discussion of the use of nuclear weapons created. This lack of clarity, only partly offset by the creation of the nuclear planning group, did ease the concerns of the countries in the central zone but is still worrisome to the Mediterranean area. The fact that this problem, which entails a distribution of forces and resources, is still with us shows once again the conflicts between politics and the military within NATO.

As we were saying then, the system of alliances, the "meeting of two polycentrisms," made possible the creation of a European order that, albeit "abnormal," laid the groundwork for potential detente, whose high point came with the various agreements that the FRG signed with the USSR and the GDR and with the final document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Helsinki document took the place of the nonexistent peace treaty of the Second World War by establishing borders in Europe.

But if detente means anything, and the 1980's begin with serious doubts as to its meaning, it is not the end of the cold war but its multiplication by division. We now realize that the bipolarization of the world is both more real than ever (for the first time, both superpowers have global intervention capabilities) and more fictitious, because the process of detente has diminished the two powers' potential to control the international situation.

It became obvious in the 1960's that if detente were to continue on the Old Continent, it had to be based on an acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe. A few months after the crisis in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968, the process of detente continued with the SALT talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had been momentarily interrupted. The superpowers apparently shared at least an interest in stabilizing the strategic environment, thus avoiding a potential confrontation that could lapse into the irrational.

The process of detente could, however, lead to a weakening of structures, with a further consequence, namely, that if there were no real alternative structures in the field of defense, conflicts between third parties or within the systems could break out more readily.

Previously, many preexisting conflicts had been suppressed by the cold war. Portugal, Greece and Spain are clear examples of the positive side of detente, whereas Cyprus would illustrate the negative side. Conflicts can, in turn, destroy the groundwork of detente, and in order to safeguard it, the structures have to be bolstered. The myth of Sisyphus still applies. The Eurocommunists know this better than anyone, because detente, which has in a way legitimized this phenomenon, could jeopardize what remains of it, and this time not because NATO would be weakened but because Eurocommunism in power would become a threat to the systems that call themselves socialist in Eastern Europe. This is the longstanding conflict between socio-political needs and geostrategical realities, and it clearly illustrates that relations among states are different from relations among societies.

De Gaulle visited Poland in 1967, shortly after his controversial trip to Canada. A prestigious French newspaper published a cartoon showing the French president at the foot of the airplane ramp upon his arrival in Warsaw being welcomed by a Polish crowd that was enthusiastically shouting: "Long live free Poland!" With his index finger to his lips the annoyed general was saying: "Quiet, please."

[14 Aug 80, p 2]

[Text] The internal problems of this alliance, which has always been complex and difficult to coordinate, include relations between the United States and its European allies, because given the current state of affairs, it is quite clear that Europe needs American strategic protection for its defense. The root of transatlantic tensions as far as security is concerned is that Europe, due to economic reasons, opted for a nuclear strategy based mainly on U.S. military might, without wishing to contribute to conventional defense to the extent necessary.

This prompted not a few contradictions, because given the nature that this relationship developed, Europe at one time feared that it would not be protected by the United States and that it would become involved in a conflict alien to its interests, a conflict stemming from a confrontation between the superpowers. This was the Gaullist dilemma, the immediate origins of which must be sought in the 1961 Berlin crisis and in the Cuban crisis the following year. De Gaulle was not rejecting the Atlantic alliance; he was leveling politically constructive criticism at NATO.

Later came European concerns about SALT. The treaty limiting missile defense systems lent greater credibility to French and British deterrence, but taken together, the SALT talks created the problem of



how to transfer this stability at the strategic superpower level to other aspects of international life. The answer, in Europe, was the SALT III talks and, in a more limited scope, mutual force reduction in the central zone. There are many facets to Europe's interest in detente and arms control, but generally speaking, we can assert that Europe has reaped greater political and economic benefits from detente than the United States. France has seen its prestige and independent image heightened, and the FRG has seen its relations with the other Germany improve. The transatlantic dialog is reversing direction now that there are doubts about the validity of detente between the two superpowers and now that the SALT talks have broken down, the reasons for which I will not broach here. Whereas previously the United States did not want the steps taken by Europe to destabilize its own moves, Europe must now find a way to salvage the benefits of detente without jeopardizing stability and balance and without undergoing a process of self-Finlandization.

Meanwhile, the strategic interplay between the United States and the USSR has evolved; the Schlesinger doctrine still prevails. We are witnessing a transition from the rationale of mutual assured destruction (in other words, the rationale of the irrational) to the rationale of balanced control capabilities. The credibility of deterrence in Europe has become an issue of European credibility in the eyes of the United States. Iran and Afghanistan are examples. NATO is in the midst of a very serious political crisis.

This is not the case militarily. Its programs are moving forward, although NATO continues to spend more than the Warsaw Pact for relatively poorer results.

This is precisely another facet of the conflict between the United States and Europe: the question of Europe's identity. The praxis of the "two pillars" is still being awaited. Among other things, the European Economic Community does not include all of the European nations that are members of NATO.

The developments in the autumn of 1973 (the Yom Kippur War triggered the most serious Atlantic crisis since the Suez incident) intensified Europe's dependence on the United States, and although a vacillating European foreign policy emerged from the CSCE and the European-Arab dialog, the perpetual problems of consultations between allies and the tensions caused within NATO by developments functionally and geographically outside its scope of action have gained renewed momentum. There is a growing tendency for these problems to be resolved outside the Western alliance, either within the EEC or at meetings of Western leaders at exotic sites.

Fifteen years ago, a then prominent Harvard professor wrote: "The sense of a European entity...could be found in stressing a specifically European way of looking at the world...which is another way of saying that it would challenge American hegemony in Atlantic policy. This could be a price worth paying for European unity, but American policy is reluctant to admit that there is a price to pay." Today, the EEC, in the midst of an internal crisis and irritated by the indecisiveness of American policy, dares not speak up along these lines.

For better or for worse, whether timely or untimely, the debate on Spain's entry into NATO has begun. Nevertheless, it is not my intention to analyze here the issue of "Spain and NATO," which would require a much broader and much more elaborate treatment. I have merely tried to bring up a number of basic issues that might help to shed some light on the decision that Spain is facing, because it must abandon a simplistic pro- or anti-Atlantic Alliance mentality. Perhaps the attempt to clear up these matters will show that those opposing Spain's membership in NATO are right...for the wrong reasons.

(Andres Ortega Klein is the holder of a licentiate from the Political Science Department in Madrid and has a master's degree in international relations from the London School of Economics ).

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## KREISKY INTERVIEWED ON AKH SCANDAL, ANDROSCH INVOLVEMENT

Vienna PROFIL in German 1 Sep 80 pp 20-24

/Interview with Chancellor Bruno Kreisky by Helmut Voska:  
"Androsch Has Failed To Convince Me"/

/Text/ PROFIL: To no one's surprise, Mr Chancellor, the latest opinion polls indicate that the SPOe has lost its absolute majority. What is surprising, however, is that the AKH scandal and the Androsch affair have not had an even more detrimental effect.

Kreisky: In between elections, there have always been downturns for the SPOe. The present one is no deeper or more worrisome than any of those we went through before. I have the most recent figures here in front of me. There is a bit of a loss but nothing dramatic or irreparable. But I am saying this with the proviso that the party charts a clear course aimed at restoring full confidence.

PROFIL: You yourself still have tremendous prestige among the public. You have enough strength, credibility and clout to solve the Androsch problem. Why don't you do something? Why don't you chart the course?

Kreisky: Because one must be sure before taking such a step that no injustice is done to anyone and, in addition, that the party rank and file will understand. The SPOe disposes of great moral power which in part finds expression in the movement's rallying to the aid of a party leader under fire. It would be a sad state of affairs, if it were otherwise. Because everyone is under fire at one time or another.

PROFIL: But you are not trying to make light of the Androsch problem now, are you?

Kreisky: By no means, really. If it turns out that there are certain connections Androsch is unable to clear up unequivocally and if certain problems arise as a consequence, then these things will have to be taken under advisement. It is noteworthy that there are only general allegations up to now to the effect that certain relations have existed as between the finance minister's firm and a variety of gentlemen. Just for the record: there were no dealings by Androsch with Winter, the man who was bribed. I do not want to go into that any further just now. Androsch did recommend Mr Wilfling, who has since been arrested-- but that was more than 10 years ago. But there is no proof as yet of any illicit dealings.

PROFIL: But Mr Chancellor...

Kreisky: ...let us further record and thereby get to the decisive point that the finance minister's firm did not itself play a scandalous role in the AKH but simply maintained certain contacts to other firms. But I will say this and this, it seems to me, is the crux of the matter: if no such firm of the finance minister's existed, there would be no grounds for these suspicions and no relations of this kind. And so I go back to what I have said all along: one can rest much easier when there are no grounds for such suspicions because a social democratic cabinet member does not own a business firm in the first place.

PROFIL: But you have known of this Androsch which is giving you such a headache now for the past 9 years.

Kreisky: No. Let me set the record straight. The firm of "Consultatio" was not established until after Androsch joined the cabinet. I had actually always thought that it was the firm of his mother. Beyond that, I paid no attention to it.

PROFIL: So Androsch did not ask you for permission before the establishment of the firm ?

Kreisky: No; certainly not.

PROFIL: Do you feel that he deceived you ?

Kreisky: I would not say that. He did not ask me for permission just as I did not object to his not asking for permission in other instances. But, as for the firm "Dr Androsch," he told me that it had ceased to exist.

Andreas. In effect, he told you a half truth and it was some-  
what dishonest of his part never to mention that "Consulting"  
had been re-established. But at the time the liberative and  
banking of the national bank opened up, Andreas was  
not hesitant about contacting you. On that occasion --you had  
enjoyed Stephan Keren long since that he would get the job  
and he agreed on it with Andreas beforehand-- the break be-  
tween you, the Chancellor, and your favorite son, politically  
and now, took place.

Kreisky: On that occasion, the finance minister did consi-  
der the possibility for an instant. At that very point, he  
was being subjected to a great deal of pressure by the oppo-  
sition and... (/Kreisky is asked to come to the telephone/)  
...they have taken Mayer into custody.

Andreas: Which Mayer: the member of the city council or the  
Chairman of the industrialists' association?

Kreisky: The chairman.

Andreas: And what is your reaction to that?

Kreisky: I have absolutely nothing to say; I am speechless.  
At any rate, this is something that has never happened in all  
of Austrian history. (/Pauses, shakes his head/) Now, what  
does this entire affair look like to me? Several firms, some  
of them foreign, took part in offering these bribes. There  
are three versions. According to the first, there were bribes  
plain and simple for the purpose of obtaining some advantage.  
Now that certainly is a criminal act which must be punished.  
One may assume in this case that the monies were not trans-  
ferred without the knowledge of the firm management. The  
second theory being advanced is that it was a combination of  
bribes and of turning white money into black. Quite a few  
people familiar with the affair are inclined to accept this  
version. Still others are afraid that if that were indeed  
the assumption, the investigation of the matter would be ex-  
tremely difficult in view of these being tax and foreign ex-  
change offenses. According to the third version, the poli-  
tical parties are said to have received funds via this route  
as well. All I can say is that the governing body of the SPO  
did not receive any payments from the firms mentioned. Any-  
one claiming to have made such payments should now come for-  
ward. I am asking them to come forward and to say when and  
under what circumstances payments on behalf of these firms  
were made to officials of the SPOe. I cannot for the life of  
me understand why this should not be possible. Why should

someone who is directly on the spot day-by-day is hesitant about saying: "Yes, gentlemen, but I did not use all the money for myself; I passed it on to this or that person, to such and such a go-between." I do not see why we cannot get to the bottom of things like that. It is a fact at any rate that substantial amounts of money were transferred to these fronts and to Mr Winter's firm.

PROFIL: Back to Androsch...

Kreisky: Well, I must admit: when he was named to the cabinet he merely informed us that he had given up his legal practice and no longer had any financial interest in it whatever.

PROFIL: Now that was patently untrue or, rather, it became untrue a few months later with the establishment of "Consultatio". Something or a parallel to the Luegendorff case.

Kreisky: It was some time before I learned of the existence of "Consultatio;" but I thought the firm belonged to his mother and that his wife was employed there. I did not learn until later that he himself was a co-owner. As to the review of "Consultatio" business dealings, he turned that over to these three trustees who, I believe, are doing a very conscientious job in the sense agreed upon which is that "Consultatio" may not deal with any item connected in any way whatever with the Austrian government.

PROFIL: But that is only part of the picture...

Kreisky: ...and the other part is that one is liable to get embroiled in any number of complications, if one owns a business as closely tied to the official duties of the finance minister. I have never made any bones about that. I have said all along that I am against it. But Androsch's reply to that was that he would sooner quit his office than give up the firm. That hurt me deeply.

PROFIL: If you look at Androsch's life style, his second income and his frequently saucy arrogance, would you then call your deputy in the cabinet and in the party the kind of social democratic politician you fancy?

Kreisky: Instead of answering your question, I would rather see the appropriate party committees discuss it first. But one thing is certain: there always were complications of this sort with Androsch and there are now.

PROFIL: The most recent of these "complications," as you call them, is this: Androsch's father-in-law, Paul Schaerf, a member of the true aristocracy, finds himself in a position to repay 180,000 schillings a month on the mortgage his son-in-law's villa. Over and above that, he must have some money to live on. You, Mr Chancellor, are making mortgage payments amounting to 10,000 schillings a month on your little house here in Mallorca. Can you explain this discrepancy?

Kreisky: It is a mystery to me; after all, Schaerf is not with "Consultatio". The finance minister will have to clear this matter up. I have no intention of getting involved; it is too complicated for me. That is what the courts are for.

PROFIL: The Schaerf story, too, is just one of the details. You yourself knew well enough that this Androsch affair must be brought to a swift conclusion to keep your party from sustaining serious damage. From the outside looking in one has the impression that the only reason you have not gotten actively involved as yet is that you are afraid the party might split up into a Kreisky and an Androsch wing.

Kreisky: There certainly is no danger of a party split. What is involved is the understandable reluctance of the SPÖ to condemn someone out of hand who is being attacked in the press and by the opposition.

PROFIL: Are you afraid of Hannes Androsch's battalions and of Anton Benya's power, who figures as Androsch's protector? He did, after all, wind up on the wrong and on the losing side on every major personnel decision of the past few years-- whenever he opposed SPÖ chairman Kreisky and SPÖ secretary general Blecha.

Kreisky: I am not in the least afraid because Benya left the decision to me in this as in other questions. No one will deny as senior a functionary of the labor movement as Anton Benya the right to maximum participation in personnel decisions. But Benya has always been extremely tactful in availing himself of this right. In the final analysis, he lets me make the decisions.

PROFIL: In the Androsch case, too?

Kreisky: Oh yes, certainly. Benya lets himself be guided by objective criteria, regardless of all the sympathy he may have for a given functionary.



PROFIL: The papers have made a point of noting that you spent exactly 55 seconds on your reply to the Govt's urgent interpellation on 22 August. And you spent not one second on defending Andresch, the man you installed as finance minister against little opposition and as deputy party chairman and vice chancellor against a great deal of opposition.

Kreisky: The interpellation dealt with a summary of highly personal accusations the contents of which are unknown to me. Based on my own knowledge, I would not take a position on any of these questions. When it turned out that these were exclusively questions dealing with the finance minister's personal affairs and his business firm, I had to leave it to Andresch to reply. Because he has to speak up for himself. I cannot speak for him.

PROFIL: Why don't you defend the things connected with Andresch's personal affairs and his firm?

Kreisky: Because I don't feel like defending all this. There is no doubt about this throughout the party and throughout the public. I am unwilling to defend these relationships. I am prepared to defend the finance minister which is what I did some time ago when I nominated him as vice chancellor during a very critical situation. I am prepared to defend his policies which reflect the policies of the entire cabinet. I do so; as a matter of fact, I do so continually. But I am not prepared to defend a business firm and its business connections. That exceeds my potential. I would not have been able to do so even if I viewed the problem in the most favorable light.

PROFIL: What the public does not yet know is that you were perfectly willing at first to read out a statement Andresch had prepared. You would have given public notice that the gulf between you and your deputy is not unbridgeable after all and would thereby have avoided this sensational showdown. Why did you depart from your original plan to read out the Andresch statement to parliament?

Kreisky: Because it seemed to me that there were certain relationships being described there of which I would have had to say over and over again: "as the finance minister tells me..." At that point I decided it was far better for him to say it himself. Certain distinctions he has made are so subtle that I can neither understand them in their entirety, nor really follow them.



PROFIL: As for example the subtle --I would call it, untrue-- statement to the effect that Rumpold never had anything whatever to do with "Consultatie" but that he did, on the other hand, receive a letter of reference from the Androsch firm. For us here at PROFIL it has been months since we were last able to follow all this. It is far too subtle for us.

Kreisky: Androsch had to do the explaining. I cannot. It was too subtle for me, too.

PROFIL: You are being very circumspect, Mr Chancellor, so as not to say "very subtle."

Kreisky: All right, if you want me to come out and say it: To be perfectly frank, in this concrete instance Androsch has failed to convince me. That is why he has to stand up for himself. After all, this is not a question of politics. Who says that I have to set these things right? After all, I am not the one being subjected to these allegations which also means that I do not have to counter them. My job is to defend our policies.

PROFIL: Based on what one hears from inside your party, Androsch would not have survived the no-confidence motion, if there had been a secret vote taken and not a roll-call vote. It is said that some SPÖ deputies would have joined the opposition in voting for the no-confidence motion.

Kreisky: The ÖVP could have asked for a secret vote. It is very interesting to note that the ÖVP was in favor of a roll-call vote. By adopting this position, the ÖVP prevented it from happening-- if what you say is true.

PROFIL: Perhaps the ÖVP was afraid of the opposite happening: that some of their deputies would have given Hannes Androsch a vote of confidence, if a secret ballot had taken place but which they could not do in the roll-call vote for reasons of party unity. Aside from that, there never is a truly secret vote taken in the Austrian parliament. Each deputy can see which card the one sitting next to him takes out of the drawer. Furthermore, the yes and the no cards have a different color.

Kreisky: That is true; but it is something for the parliament to worry about. I am convinced the fraction would have held together on that vote.

PROFIL: Is Androsch supposed to draw up the 1981 budget and then fade into political oblivion after tripping over the origination tax?

Kreisky: The origination tax entails an objective debate of fundamental importance. Tax questions have always been questions of principle and have always had a strong class character. The origination tax, as I understand it, is a tax on interest income to be paid by the banks. I find such a tax all the more practicable because I know that interest rates are being raised from one day to the next just to draw customers away from a competing bank. If it was possible to raise interest rates from 4.5 to 8.5 or even 9 percent, then a 1 percent origination tax will not be too much to bear.

PROFIL: In countering this argument, one could say that this 1 percent, too, will be handed down to those who save and borrow from the banks.

Kreisky: Yes. That applies to everything. It also applied to the interest rate competition that went on. Aside from all this, the banks, in looking at their disbursement strategies, should be reminded of their own mortality. In my view, this large-scale expansion of branch offices is going much too far. It makes no sense and runs counter to the concept of thrift to have three banks on almost every corner.

PROFIL: If I hear correctly, that means that the chancellor wants the origination tax to be instituted.

Kreisky: It will come. It is a small payment on account for the banks being able to maintain the most secret bank accounts in Europe. A small contribution for keeping that privilege may well be in order.

PROFIL: Much as you speak out in favor of the origination tax, Androsch condemns it. His offer to resign over this issue is on the table. At the time you received it, you said to me: "I will not make it that easy for him." But soon enough you may and provide him with an honorable way out, to boot.

Kreisky: It is pretty clear that I do not like such offers to resign. I am not keen on being threatened time and again.

PROFIL: And then there is the story of the Androsch villa. For some weeks now, you have been familiar with the particulars of the relationships between Paul Schaerf, the Danube Insurance Company and the finance minister.

Kreisky: That business is so complicated and there is so much banker's discretion involved that I would rather wait until things clear up a bit more. The minister of justice has announced that there is an investigation underway. In this particular instance, there is no validity to claiming banker's discretion because there is a suspicion of criminal offenses having been committed. That in itself entitles the authorities to conduct an investigation. I do not want to prejudge any of this. The matter is being discussed inside the party. But it would be both exaggerated and insincere to maintain that this kind of thing leaves no trace whatever on a political party.

PROFIL: What is your time schedule for clearing up this entire affair ?

Kreisky: I believe a solution will have to be found very soon-- during the course of September. One cannot let this type of thing go on indefinitely.

PROFIL: Otherwise, there is no way of conducting an effective economic and budgetary policy at a critical time like the present when the chancellor and the finance minister disagree such as the two of you do.

Kreisky: The whole of political life suffers because of this affair. No one talks about politics as such any more. Everyone is talking about events taking place on the fringes of our political life.

PROFIL: What is your opinion of Club 45 and of the Freemasons ? Do you feel like becoming a member ?

Kreisky: No. I don't belong to any clubs, except to Vienna.

PROFIL: They have gone down into the second division, but the Gratz club which opened its doors to Messrs Winter, Wilfling and Androsch's confidant Bauer has made it to the top.

Kreisky: I am sure Gratz would not have had any dealings with them, if he had known that they are being charged with a crime.

PROFIL: On the other hand, it does not really speak for Leopold Gratz that he attracted people of this sort as a flame attracts moths. The very least one would have to say of Gratz is that he is a poor judge of character. The ranks of the pretenders to your throne are thinning out.

Kreisky: I myself have never spoken of pretenders to the throne.

PROFIL: What was all the showing off of pretenders good for in the end? Was the SPÖ trying to say to people: look at how many spare Kreiskys we have in reserve. Now, that no longer applies in Androsch's or Gratz's case. Or was the party trying to tell aggressive comers: wait a little longer; your turn will come soon enough-- just so no pretender jumps the gun and starts a war of succession and a "dump Kreisky" movement?

Kreisky: There is really no need for anyone to issue that call. I think I have enough of an intuition to tell when the time has come. At any rate, I am certainly not going to wait until someone asks: "When is Kreisky ever going to step down?" I will do so before things get to that point. But nobody need have any qualms, as far as I am concerned. I am now close to seventy. I think I have done the job I set out to do. At all events, Austria now presents a different picture than it did 10 years ago. What distresses me most is the shadow being cast on our public life. That is why we must try to get over this state of affairs as quickly as possible.

PROFIL: Androsch is still counting on the loyalty of his adherents among the party leadership and on Lausacker, Haiden and Broda among the cabinet members; he is counting on the ÖGB fraction, on the rank and file and on support "particularly in the large-scale enterprises." If he manages to stay in office, then that means that he has more of a following in all these places than you do.

Kreisky: I have never given much thought to which one of us has the bigger following. For me, the basis of confidence I have in the party is good enough. It would be great for anyone else to have. A controversy such as you are referring to will most certainly not arise; nor will there be a do-or-die vote.

PROFIL: Are you secretly worried about Androsch resigning because you have no suitable successor to offer? The only two you might consider are interior minister Lanc and your personal secretary Jacina.

Kreisky: I do not want to talk about a successor because this question has not yet arisen. But there would be several well-qualified successors. I have enough information on people to be able to make a quick decision. It need not be a tax expert or someone who has studied economics, but a politician with a head on his shoulders. Do you know who the most successful Swedish finance minister was ?

PROFIL: No.

Kreisky: A classical scholar.

PROFIL: Let me read an important Kreisky quote to you: "My political talents are largely based on the fact that my 50-year membership in my party has taught me what I may and what I may not expect of it. On the very day that I cross that line or fail to see it, the party will break with me--you can bet on that." Do you feel you have reached that line in the Androsch affair ?

Kreisky: I still stand by that statement. But I do not want to elaborate on it.

PROFIL: Do you feel hemmed in ?

Kreisky: If a large party like ours with the traditions we have gets into such a situation, then there is absolute clarity and agreement on the need for certain things to happen. If that is not the case, serious differences will arise in the party. It is my job to keep that from happening.

PROFIL: Are you saying we can exclude the possibility of Androsch's winning the power struggle and staying in the cabinet and of your quitting before the end of your term ?

Kreisky: I am not prepared to wage a power struggle with Androsch.

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## PUBLIC SHOWS MIXED REACTION TO KREISKY, ANDROSCH AFFAIR

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 9 Sep 80 p 4

[Report by correspondent R. St. on Vienna General Hospital scandal: "Kreisky Threatens To Resign--Mixed Reaction by Public"]

[Text] Vienna, 6 September--There has been mixed public reaction to Austrian Federal Chancellor Kreisky's remarks in which he stated under which conditions he would remain in office--remarks which were primarily intended to induce Vice Chancellor and Finance Minister Androsch to quit the government. While the call for cleaner politics was accepted, the theatrical way in which it was made was widely regarded as exaggerated. The very evening on which Kreisky delivered his speech in Linz a cartoon was published showing him as Moses with the tables of the law, and the so-called list of demands--not only in private but also in public conversation--has become known as "the Ten Commandments." It is not customary--and must also strike many a Socialist as odd--for the head of a party to drag a confrontation with a minister into the open, for everyone to witness, and to take a stand there as a guardian of public morality.

## A Power Struggle

It is true that Kreisky is justified in saying that there is an issue to be settled in the Androsch affair--namely, whether it is possible at the same time to hold a ministerial post and to be a partner in a tax-consulting service. Yet Kreisky has to put up with people objecting that he has tolerated this state of affairs for several years, even if perhaps he had not been put completely in the picture when he first took office in spring 1970. When the press pilloried Hannes Androsch's private business affairs a couple of years ago, Kreisky was satisfied with a compromise which he now apparently regards as inadequate. At that time the head of the party apparently met with internal party resistance in striving to draw a clear line. Now Kreisky knows he has the support of a population aroused by the General Hospital scandal and feels the pressure of his party's left-wing, which regards Androsch as a capitalist. Thus the confrontation about an issue inescapably takes on clear features of a power struggle.



### Resignation of Androsch?

The outcome of the struggle seems clear. Chances are that on Monday and Tuesday the leading organs of the SPÖ (Austrian Socialist Party) will accept the chancellor's conditions not only for reasons of utter comprehension and conviction but also for reasons of party discipline and because they rightly believe that Kreisky is the one most likely to find a way out of the crisis. Thereupon Androsch is likely to offer his resignation from the government. It is not yet clear what will happen to his party posts. It appears that Education Minister Fred Sinowatz, calm and popular because of his even temperament, will be the new vice-chancellor. Minister of the Interior Land at present is the favorite to become minister of finance. It remains to be seen whether the time is ripe for splitting the ministry--something the federal chancellor would like to see done--and it is possible that there will be changes in other ministerial posts.

### Different Origins

Without a doubt, Tuesday's decision will be a turning point in Austrian politics. The dissociation of Bruno Kreisky and Hannes cannot be equated with the disagreements which in the past few years, for example, have led to the departure of Defense Minister Luetgendorf and Minister of Health Ledolter. Kreisky and Androsch are primarily two social democrats of different age and different origin. The 69-year-old chancellor is a party man of the old stamp whose political thought and action have been deeply affected by the 1930's, mass unemployment, the party's illegal period and national socialism. Particularly in the past 5 years he has ruled the country in a broadminded and pragmatic manner, leaving many a young Marxist zealot, whose theoretical knowledge he was still able to match, out in the rain. With a moderate left-liberal flair, he provided the Socialist Party with broad popular support. Yet he did not ignore the specific interests and aim of a workers party for all that. Internationally Austria through Kreisky undoubtedly has begun to play a role which has been denied to the other small countries. So it is probably an exaggeration to say that, as he himself insinuated in a resigned tone some days ago, his work of construction is being destroyed by the General Hospital scandal.

The 42-year-old Androsch has made a great contribution to the development of the party. Under his fiscal leadership Austria became credit-worthy abroad, and the often seemingly predominant trade unions began to comprehend where the limits of their demands lay. In the past few years, however, Androsch has personified not so much the fundamental idea of social democracy as the principle of economic efficiency. His departure apparently is cause for far greater regret in middle-class circles than among the party core. The reason for the apparently inevitable break must, however, be sought in Androsch's own lack of insight: he failed to realize that public service and private business are irreconcilable. To point out that the same happens in the Laender is not helpful. Nor is it a case here by

any means of the widely mocked cleanliness in politics; what is at stake is fundamental questions concerning the viability of democracy. It is particularly difficult to decide these questions because the Austrian political parties, and particularly the government party, have formed the conviction that they alone have the answer. By overcoming this view, Kreisky might be able to set new standards.

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## NEONAZI TERRORIST GROUP, LEADER ARRESTED

Hamburg DEP SPIEGEL in German 8 Sep 80 pp 111-114

[Article: "Bombs and Tirades"]

[Text] Last week, a genuine terror group was raided. They are responsible for murders and bomb blasts. The suspected ringleader: Neonazi Manfred Roeder, who had been on the wanted list for a long time.

Nobody on the radical Right made as much noise about the Nazis as did Attorney Manfred Roeder. He organized "Reichstage" [national rallies] and he was a prophet of real "liberation." He considers Auschwitz a "lie," the FRG a "rag-tag democracy," and feels that the whole country is full of "collaborators." One day he sent a message from South America, stating that he would not return to this country until "other laws" go into effect.

He had every reason to feel that way. The brownshirt, a Neonazi agitator who had been reported and indicted many times, occasionally even sentenced, had of late been a fugitive from the reviled laws; the Federal Prosecutor's Office had issued a warrant for the arrest of the former attorney.

Now they caught him. When he returned last week, earlier than planned, Manfred Roeder was arrested in Hannover's Munden. Officials went into action against the Ultraright everywhere in the FRG, and in addition to Roeder, they arrested a few other top figures from that segment of the Neonazi scene which for some time had been responsible for bomb blasts and arson:

--Raimund Hoernle, 49, a foreman, and Sibylle Vorderbruegge, 24, a medical technician, the alleged murderers of Vietnamese refugees in Hamburg. In the meantime they have confessed to a number of terrorist acts, among them, setting fire to a refugee shelter on 22 August, which killed two residents in Hamburg;

--Heinz Colditz, 50, a physician, who admitted that he took part in two bomb blasts at the beginning of the year in Esslingen;

--Golditz' daughter Gabriele, 25, an X-ray technician, and Klaus-Peter Schulze, 23, an engineer; both are activists from Hamburg.

The Federal Prosecutor's Office is accusing all of these six people in custody of belonging to a terrorist group which calls itself "German Action Groups" and which in recent months claimed responsibility for terrorist acts after they happened. Roeder is said to be the ringleader.

The crimes occurred always in connection with problems involving asylum-seekers: Bombs exploded in the Esslingen Landrat office (21 February), which is disliked by the ultras because of its sympathy for foreigners; at the house of Esslingen Landrat Braun (18 April); at the door of the Hamburg Janusz-Korczak School, a shelter for foreigners (27 April); in the FRG central camp in Zirndorf (30 July) and on 17 August in a shelter in Loerrach, at which time a woman was seriously injured. Both of the Hamburg victims died in a fire that had been started with Molotov cock-tails.

There seems to be little doubt that members of the German Action Group were responsible for all the crimes. The metal pipe bombs were always constructed identically. Hoernle admits to having made them; according to confessions, he and his gang must also be credited with the Hamburg attack.

The perpetrators met and conspired, they bombed and set fires according to a system. Thus, for the first time, the radical right underground is also mobilizing, faithful to the example of the extreme left faded Baader-Meinhof group.

To date, they have been more or less content with calling attention to themselves by wearing uniforms, hoarding weapons and using Nazi slogans. Most of the time, it amounted to nothing more than brawls, vulgarities and smeared slogans. It was rare that a group of violent Neofascists had to appear in court, as happened last year when the youth leader Michael Kuehnen and his companions were sentenced for inciting the people and stealing weapons.

Since the demise of Neonazi parties toward the end of the 1960's, the radical Right in the FRG had become a matter for bizarre little groups. There were no serious incidents of right-wing excesses. But they occurred in schools and establishments of the Bundeswehr, where in recent years Hitler jokes and "symbolic burnings of Jews" were registered.

At any rate, the groups on the radical Right could hardly inspire the frightening picture of an "FRG Fascism," the clowning of a "Military Sports Group Hoffmann" could hardly be considered proof of a Neonazi rearmament, something that was occasionally alluded to at home and abroad.

Such wrong assessments, which seemed to be particularly prevalent on the Left, caused defiant reactions among those Germans who stood to the right of center. As a consequence, the activities were played down, the brown braggarts were declared "lost crowds" (DIE WELT) and formally they were already replaced.

A symptomatic example was supplied last week by the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (FAZ), which of late seems to feel that the difference between left and right is equivalent to the difference between chaos and stability anyway, which is the reason why right now real terror does not fit the scene. On Tuesday last week, FAZ editors managed to relegate to page 2, bottom right, the news of the arrest of the alleged murderers in a 17-line report.

For a long time, even constitutionalists were looking at the colorful ultraright scene of approximately 100 organizations, listening to their random statements, and declared that they were harmless. In the view of professional defenders, the ultraright wing never recuperated from the decline of the NDP.

All too long, rightists have benefited from the tendencies of measuring the threats by militant brownshirts according to the --naturally nonexistent-- danger of a Nazi coup. Frequently, searches for criminals were dragging along. Often, no criminal proceedings resulted. Not until the attack in Hamburg, i.e. 8 months after the beginning of the attack series of the "German Action Groups," the Federal Prosecutor's Office intervened--someone had to die first," DIE ZEIT commented.

Over a long period of time, branches of the German Neonazi scene have acquired conspiratorial techniques and international connections, extending from South Tirolean secessionist bombers and Belgian former Nazis to radical right-wing French groups and U.S. swastika wearers. While a fugitive from federal prosecutors, Attorney Roeder made a lecture stop at the "National Basis Switzerland."

To be sure, the new brownshirts with their comical costumes and tirades have little prospect of popularizing their "struggle for liberation" (Roeder). Their newly forced fight against asylum-seeking foreigners, however, is getting much closer to the ideas of many West Germans. Many opinion polls and reactions from the population are an indication of increasing hostilities toward foreigners on the part of FRG citizens.

The slogan "Out with foreigners," distributed by Neonazis during the election campaign and sprayed on the walls where their deeds occur, threaten to find fertile ground even among many politically uninterested youths. Youth experts and sociologists estimate that approximately 15 percent of the young people favor authoritarian solutions to problems. According to an investigation by Psychologist Jaide, 18 percent of the 18-year-old population feels that "the strongest leadership possible" by the state is necessary and 28 percent feel that the deportation of guest workers is appropriate. Such a world view threatens to accommodate right-wing terrorism or even encourage it.

A contributing factor to the fact that the fringe of the radical Right has been underestimated, has been the continually peculiar format of the leading personalities, most of whom resemble Neonazis portrayed in picture-books: Hoffmann (Military Sports Group), the twirly-bearded uniform fan, Thies Christophersen ("Auschwitz lie"), the blood-and-soil farmer, Edgar Geiss, who used the Hitler salute at Kappler's grave. And the old werewolves from a good middle-class background who have just been arrested fit the picture very well--a foreman who is an arsonist and a physician who manufactures bombs.

Again and again, Attorney Roeder also attracted attention with his eccentricities. During the 1960's, as a CDU member, he led a much-publicized crusade in the name of decency--against sex fairs and pornographic papers, and in full agreement with his party which, under politicians like Adlof Suesterhenn, carried out a campaign for decency and clean movies. At that time, in the opinion of Roeder, West Germany had not yet become a "dirty republic," it was only "pig pen No 1."

The national man was still outwardly conforming to the CDU when he helped establish the "Democratic Club" in Berlin, which was leaning toward the Right and a counterpart to the Republican Club of the extra-parliamentary opposition. There Roeder met with conservative labor unionists, right-wing SPD members and many prominent members of the local CDU, for instance, Peter Lorenz. They were fighting against the "sick national sentiment" and "advocates of degeneration; once, the club made an appeal to the population to help the police chase demonstrators. Even for this circle, however, Roeder's actions were too far to the Right; he left the club in 1967, the same year in which it was founded.

Indefatigably, Roeder appeared again and again as a political clown. He convened popular happenings, a "national assembly" in Regensburg, another one in Flensburg. He sent a letter to Idi Amin, asking his help for the reestablishment of the Reich. To Ernesto Geisel, the then president of Brazil, the attorney appealed in 1978 "in the name of the German Reich and international law" to release Gustav Wagner, the arrested concentration-camp criminal ("Do not soil your soldier's honor.").

At his "national residence" near Bad Hersfeld, the attorney conducted the affairs of a "German citizens initiative," the same address is also used for a "German Reich freedom movement," the letterhead of which shows Roeder's favorite emblem, three crossed torches.

Because of many criminal proceedings on his own behalf--"public business" the attorney called it--the chancellory practically collapsed already years ago. The host had to face many trials, for inciting the people, resisting police officers, physical assault, defamation of the state.

In 1976, Attorney Roeder was barred from practicing his profession, in 1978, he escaped from the German authorities. While fleeing from Europe,



His route took him through North and South America and the Middle East. Twice, he barely escaped extradition. In contrast to the other five Germans, Roeder was not placed in pre-trial custody last week--right now he has to serve a 6 month prison term for propaganda against the coalition. In Flenzburg, Roeder had demanded in May 1975 the "restoration of the former Reich government."

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## D'66 POSITION CONTINUES GETTING STRONGER

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 6 Sep 80 pp 24-25

[Report by Frank Laforte "D'66 (Democrats '66) Is Indeed In Love, But Doesn't Know Yet with Whom"]

[Text] All is going well with D'66, and it is even true in the opinion polls. Should the latter indeed come true [in the elections], then the youthful Democrats will jump to a multiple of their current number of chamber seats. It is not surprising that other political parties are passionately watching the start of a reasonable alternative. But strangely enough, D'66 also now suddenly sees many more alternatives after the elections of May '81. With a cautious start, perhaps later on you can govern with whom you choose. D'66 is head over heels in love, but it is still keeping the name of its partner(s) secret a little longer.

"For structural changes, one must govern longer than 4 years, with a majority which is preferably a little larger than half plus one. It is annoying but true: both conditions can be met better with the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal]. The progressive minority cabinet deserves a low priority, because it will not yield much."

This pragmatic, but not too friendly, recommendation for the Christian Democrats was aired by D'66 Member of the First Chamber J. Vis in his party publication. The Democrats are getting to be more and more in a governing mood. And who can argue with the established club of rebels of Dr Jan Terlouw? The various opinion polls predict nothing but sensational election victories this year for the "fourth current," NIPO [Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion], which regularly provides the large parties with confidential figures, polled the mood among the electorate in July also. Even Jan Terlouw didn't believe the outcome this time. D'66, until now with only 8 seats in the Second Chamber, currently is worth 29 seats. A gain in seats which is primarily won from the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] and the PvdA [Labor Party]. The Socialists will

have almost 12 seats less, primarily through the doing of their "natural ally D'66" (a term of PvdA-mythmaker Den Uyl and Meijer).

The dissatisfaction is also noticeable and considerable in the VVD following, as evidenced by the heavy toll the liberals have to pay in the "polls" for the government responsibility. Their loss of around 10 seats flows largely to the most important competitor: D'66. That development is extremely alarming to the liberals. It will be difficult to compensate for the losses because the VVD-advance in the South Netherlands, so successful until recently, is threatening to stagnate according to NIPO figures.

Coalition partner CDA is surviving the turmoil of battle better. D'66 doesn't appear to exert too much pull on CDA voters. The Christian Democrats are consolidating their bastions of Brabant and Limburg. That shows up, amongst other things, in the number of CDA chamber seats, which is largely remaining equal.

In new elections the Christian Democrats would become the largest group, closely followed by the PvdA and D'66, who would crowd the VVD out of the third place. D'66's thinning out of the socialist voters' potential has caused considerable excitement in the PvdA. Shocked Opposition Leader Den Uyl -- already declared unavailable as new prime minister by the two wings of the PvdA -- hurried to state last week that surely one should not doubt the natural alliance between the Democrats and the Socialists. But in the same breath the gray eminence of the PvdA added that the Socialists really ought to pipe down a little and should not make the same historical mistake of 1977 by setting very hard conditions beforehand for cooperation with the CDA.

These sounds had been launched already earlier by a faithful page of Den Uyl, former Secretary of State Wim Meijer. Just like D'66 member Vis, Meijer no longer sees much of any use in a leftist majority cabinet and in principle cooperation with the CDA should be possible. Meijer and Vis have difficulty understanding the declaration of love to the Christian Democrats. Meijer: "Cooperation with the CDA will never show harmony."

The left wing of the PvdA meanwhile reacted rather viciously to the gain of D'66. Its exponent, Member of the Second Chamber Hans Kombrink, last week gave a tough lashing to the natural allies of the Socialists. D'66, says Kombrink, obviously is facing an important choice: "It can develop itself into a central party which wants to derive its position of power from any imaginable coalition- and exchange possibilities. Then deterioration will have set in, in view of its origin and its almost 15-year tradition and devotion. And then it will strengthen the position of the CDA. It can also remain what it still is: an individual, progressive group which strives for a certain policy and simultaneously for political clarity. And then it will strengthen the threat for the CDA."

To all appearances the natural allies have found each other precisely on this point: we opt for the CDA out of negative considerations. The content of this philosophy has been put forward openly by Kombrink: "It could be that an attempt to govern with the CDA again will have more effect. That party could erode through that, just as was the case with the NVP [Catholic People's Party] after 1966, or internal contrasts could increase, as was the case after 1977."

Cooperation between Democrats and Socialists does not extend much further than a joint distaste for the Christian Democrats -- apparently still needed to complete a cabinet on a broad basis. Afterward the roads will part, for the Democrats don't have much need to show their color right away -- things are going so well in the opinion polls. It is known that a key position is waiting for D'66 after the elections. And it is precisely because of this hunger for power, and with the words of the Roman Senator Lucatius Catulus to Caesar in mind, that Kombrink would want to add the remark to Terlouw: "You're no longer working underground. Your artillery has been positioned to conquer the government power."

The big craving for government power: there's nothing new under the sun. Only the tactics change. For the time being the Christian Democrats, Liberals and Socialists can only guess whether D'66 aspires to the government power and if yes, with which partners?

The proposal of the D'66 parliamentary group to the executive committee of the party namely doesn't want the Democrats to give their opinion on party-political strategy until their congress in February 1981. Thus the shadow-boxing between the PvdA and D'66 can continue undisturbedly until the eve of the elections. At this stage the Democrats are not terribly charmed by the "annexation policy" of the PvdA, which regularly and greedily labels the Democrats "allies." Until now the various spokesmen of D'66, speaking about the formation of a new cabinet, have purposefully let a great number of variations file past. The combinations of PvdA-D'66, PvdA-VVD-D'66 (Glastra van Loon and Terlouw), PvdA-D'66 (majority cabinet Terlouw), PvdA-D'66 (minority cabinet Terlouw) and other couples all are among the broad range of possibilities.

What is indeed interesting, thanks to the favorable prognosis, is that D'66 can afford to put aside the hobbyhorses to which Kombrink loves to refer. The forming of an entirely new two-party system, to be achieved by constitutional reforms and one progressive democratic party, have disappeared from the banner of D'66. The long-cherished ideal of a political two-current country is further removed than ever and is the strongest with the Socialists in this year of 1980. The Democrats now see themselves as the fourth and after the elections of 1981 as the third current. An entirely clear verdict on government participation after the elections no longer has a central position in D'66's thinking, as evidenced by the many choices possible.

Meanwhile, sometimes little can be noticed in the Second Chamber about a possible entente cordiale between Socialists and Democrats. In the nation's meeting hall, the D'66 group is manipulating its own tactics with considerable velvet chamberwide motions.

Especially in D'66's own spearhead policy (environment, innovation and energy policy, development aid, defense and foreign affairs) this is a formidable weapon which constantly crowds the large groups onto the defensive. D'66 spokesmen such as Brinkhorst (foreign affairs and defense) and Engwirda (social affairs and economic affairs) have developed the clever policy line of launching such motions in the second hearing. At that time, the remark is constantly added: The Chamber, having heard the discussion, etc.

In the first hearing the parties often played their trump cards only to back out on their own positions afterward. Thus D'66 will get the opportunity to play the shining role of reconciler. A pose which well suits the party, in view of the opinion polls.

For the VVD, CDA and PvdA it is a life-sized question whether they ought to continue to support the motions of the Democrats, drawn up by the full chamber, with their rather general content. If they withhold that support from now on, a considerable bite will fall away from the D'66 strategy.

The hate-love relationship between the CDA and D'66 is very interesting. Ostensibly the parties do have a few reconcilable points. CDA and D'66 resolutely repudiate the contrast of "progressive-conservative" -- in this case "liberal-socialist" -- as the only real political contrast. The two political currents emphasize non-material values. And while the CDA has remained in the middle of the political power field already since 1945, D'66 is now also trying to build up a central function. That is very clear from the temporary group standpoint with respect to the positioning of new nuclear arms on Dutch soil. Jan Terlouw says in his party paper: "Under consideration is the view that the positioning in our country must in any event be rejected if the number of 572 is not considerably decreased, SALT II is not ratified, or the Warsaw Pact turns out to be prepared to decrease significantly the number of its own long-range arms."

Where have we heard these things before? Precisely. CDA Defense Specialist Ton Frinking already brought up the same objections at the beginning of the nuclear arms debate. Then is this a reasonable alternative?

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## PVDA, D'66 SUBMIT DRAFT ON ABORTION LAW

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 3 Sep 80 pp 1,2

[Report by political editorial staff: "Woman Decides in Abortion Law of PvdA [Labor Party] and D'66 [Democrats '66]"]

[Text] The Hague, 3 Sep-- PvdA and D'66 submitted their own bill on abortion this afternoon in the Second Chamber. Their starting point is that the woman decides and that abortion should disappear from the penal code. The PvdA-D'66 bill now is the third bill before the court, alongside those of the government and of the SGP [Political Reformed Party]/G PV [Reformed Political Union].

The proposal of PvdA and D'66 is in its main points identical to the 1976 bill of PvdA and VVD which was passed by the Second Chamber but was defeated by the First Chamber in December 1976.

The intention of submitters Roethof (PvdA) and Mrs. Wessel-Tuinstra (D'66) is that their proposal should be discussed later than the government proposal, but definitely before the coming elections, thus they say in the explanatory statement. Aiming at the VVD parliamentary group they write: "In this manner no one will be able to plead absence of an alternative at the final decision."

The bill stipulates that the physician must examine whether the woman has come to her decision freely and in accordance with her responsibility. If necessary, and if the woman agrees, he consults with other experts and the procreator of the fetus. Further the physician is under the obligation, partly in view of the duration of the pregnancy, to arrange for sufficient support and information on alternatives to abortion. Within 5 days after the request, the physician must notify the woman about his findings and, if necessary, discuss them.

The bill deviates on some points from the PvdA-VVD bill of 1976. The woman's right of decision has been included in the law more explicitly through the addition of a new subsection 5 in Article 2 which reads: "The decision on terminating or not terminating the pregnancy rests with the



woman, unimpeded by the responsibility of the physician, whether he cooperates or not."

#### No Obligation

The special testing commission, which had to advise the minister of public health on the execution of the law, has disappeared from the bill. Further, the explicit stipulation is included that no one is obliged to cooperate in abortion against his conscience. On both points the new proposal meets the criticism which the VVD parliamentary group in the First Chamber had against the PvdA-VVD bill at the time. Also, the suggestion of the Council of State (as a result of the government bill) to suffice with one general regulation as to secrecy of data has been followed.

The PvdA and D'66 groups have not yet decided whether they will try to adjust the proposal of Ministers Ginjaar (VVD) and De Ruiter (CDA) [Christian Democratic Appeal] through amendments. That also depends on the question of the degree to which the cabinet is prepared to meet the criticism which has been leveled against the bill by the CDA- and VVD-groups. The answer of Ginjaar and De Ruiter is expected at the beginning of next week.

PvdA and D'66 have opted for a later discussion of their bill than that of the government proposal because otherwise, they say, no true weighing of the merits of the case will take place, but a political voting corresponding to linking the CDA and VVD to the government accord.

Another factor which plays a role is that in a simultaneous discussion the PvdA-D'66 bill, being the most far-reaching, would be up for voting first and in that case would almost certainly be rejected through lack of support by the VVD group.

If however the government bill doesn't achieve a majority in the Chamber this fall, then the VVD will be free to support other bills on the basis of the government accord. VVD Spokesman Dees said this morning that the government proposal will be considered first by the VVD. "We are committed to the government accord and for the time being we cannot consider other bills. Only after the government bill has been rejected will we give our opinion on the PvdA/D'66 bill.

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